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Case No. 960203-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an order granting Defendant/Appellee 
Angelo Giron's ("Giron") motion to suppress, entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable William B. Bohling, presiding. Jurisdiction 
is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). See also State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that the state 
failed to demonstrate the warrantless search of Giron's vehicle 
was "incident to arrest" where the state presented no evidence in 
support of that theory? 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that impounding 
Giron's vehicle was not justified where the state failed to 
demonstrate necessity? 
3. Did the trial court correctly rule that the search of 
Giron's vehicle was not justified as an "inventory search" where 
1 
the involved officer failed to comply with inventory search 
procedures? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A bifurcated review standard applies 
with respect to each issue presented for review. With regard to 
the facts, the trial judges are "in the best position to assess 
the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the pro-
ceedings as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to 
garner from a cold record." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 
(Utah 1994). Thus, this Court will review the trial court's 
factual findings for clear error. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 
1182, 1186 (Utah 1995). The facts will be considered in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination. Pena, 869 
P.2d at 935-36. This Court will review the trial court's 
conclusions of law under a correctness standard. The nature of 
this particular determination of law allows the trial court "a 
measure of discretion . . . when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts." Id. at 93 9. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum A. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
On January 25, 1995, Giron was charged by information with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 3rd° felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953 as amended) . 
(Record on Appeal ("R.") at 8-9.) On May 15, 1995, he moved to 
suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car 
in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the federal constitution, and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. (R. 45-46.) During an evidentiary 
hearing on the matter, the state called the arresting officer, 
Dale Bench ("Bench"), and Officer Anthony Russell ("Russell") to 
testify. (R. 50; 124-178.) Thereafter, each party submitted 
memoranda to the trial court for review (R. 53-61; 62-69) and 
presented oral argument on the matter. (R. 70; 181-219.) 
On October 30, 1995, the trial court granted the motion to 
suppress. (R. 70.) The state filed a motion for reconsideration 
(R. 78-81), which was denied. (R. 91.) The trial court entered 
amended findings and conclusions (R. 92-96), a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum B, and the state requested dismissal 
of the charge against Giron on the basis that the state had 
insufficient evidence to proceed. The trial court granted the 
request for dismissal (R. 108-10), and the state filed a notice 
of appeal (R. 114-115) followed by a motion for summary reversal 
(Motion for Summary Reversal, dated 4/10/96), which this Court 
denied. (Order, dated 5/28/96.) 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 22, 1995, Officer Bench ("Bench") observed Giron 
execute an improper U-turn in his vehicle, prompting Bench to 
activate his overhead lights and follow Giron until he stopped at 
a curbside. (R. 124-126.) Bench asked Giron for a driver's 
license, and he produced a Utah identification card. Giron's 
passenger, Zaragoza, exited the vehicle and in so doing dropped 
an unidentified item. Bench suspected the item was narcotics (R. 
126-127; State's Brief ("S.B.") at 4) but never confirmed his 
suspicions. Bench's partner, Officer Ruth ("Ruth"), chased 
Zaragoza on foot to Zaragoza's backyard, where they engaged in a 
struggle. (R. 126-127; 150-151.) Upon observing the struggle, 
Bench instructed Giron to stay put, then he proceeded to 
Zaragoza's backyard to assist Ruth. It was possible Giron did 
not hear or understand Bench's instructions. (R. 127-128; 152.) 
He left the area. (R. 128.) 
After Bench and his partner apprehended Zaragoza, Bench ran 
a records check on Giron and learned his driver's license was 
suspended. Bench also learned Giron's home address. (R. 128-
129.) Bench "responded to the address" approximately "three 
hours" after the initial stop and determined "nobody was at 
home". (R. 129.) Upon leaving the area, Bench noticed Giron and a 
second passenger in the car. (R. 130.) Bench immediately acti-
vated his lights and pursued them. Giron pulled to a stop along 
the curb "right across the street from his house." (R. 130; 153.) 
Bench approached Giron in the vehicle and told him he was 
4 
under arrest for failing to obey the lawful order of a police 
officer. (R. 130-131; 154.) Bench then asked Giron to step out 
of the car, placed handcuffs on Giron and placed him in the 
police vehicle. (R. 131; 154-155.) Bench then obtained 
registration information for the car and ran a computer check on 
it. (R. 155.) Sometime thereafter, Bench searched the car and 
found contraband. (R. 132-133.) 
The evidence fails to support the notion that Bench engaged 
in a standardized "inventory" search. With respect to 
impoundment, the record is void of evidence that Bench actually 
assessed whether Giron's passenger could drive Giron's car from 
directly across the street where it was parked on the curbside 
into Giron's driveway (R. 156); Bench admittedly failed to check 
whether some alternative to impounding the vehicle existed (R. 
156); Bench failed to ask Giron whether "there were any neighbors 
or some other person who could drive [the] car into his driveway 
across the street from where he was parked." (R. 157.) 
In addition, Bench failed to comply with inventory 
procedures. Although he had pen and paper available for the 
purpose of conducting an inventory search, he did not have those 
items "in hand" and he made "no list whatsoever of what [he] 
found in the vehicle." (R. 158-159.) After Bench "completed" (R. 
159) the search of the vehicle, he dispatched for Officer 
Russell. (R. 159-160.) When Russell arrived at the scene, he was 
aware that Bench had searched the car for drugs. (R. 174-75.) 
However, Bench made no indication to Russell that he had 
5 
initiated an inventory search of the car. (R. 173-174.) Thus, 
Russell performed an inventory search from top to bottom "as if 
nothing had been done" -- as if "Bench had never been in that 
vehicle." (R. 174.) 
Salt Lake Policies and Procedures on Impound state the 
following: 
To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle 
owner, officers shall use discretion in determining whether 
or not a vehicle should be impounded. 
• * * 
B. Vehicle Inventory 
A thorough inventory search will be made of all vehicles 
being impounded (ref. § 4-04-03.05). A thorough inventory 
search will include: [interior, trunk, closed containers, 
etc.] 
• * * 
The officer will include in the initial report: 
1. Valuables placed into evidence[.] 
2. Valuable items left in the vehicle because of the 
difficulty of transporting them to evidence (large 
machinery, etc.) will be listed in the report's 
details. 
3. If no valuables are found in the vehicle, the officer 
will note that information in the report's details. 
(State's Exhibit 1-S; R. 162-63.) Bench acknowledged that 
specific guidelines mandate that an officer document certain 
inventory procedures contemporaneous with the inventory search. 
(R. 166.) Bench did not document in writing information relevant 
to the search. (R. 158-59.) 
During an evidentiary hearing in this matter, Russell 
testified that when he arrived, he conducted an inventory, 
prepared an inventory report, and called a tow truck to remove 
the vehicle. (State's Exhibit S-2; R. 167-168.) Russell 
documented in writing the items that were in the vehicle and the 
6 
vehicle's condition pursuant to the impound policy. (R. 169.) 
He reiterated the importance of documenting inventory search 
procedures contemporaneous with performing them. (R. 172.) 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and following 
oral argument on the matter, the trial court stated in part the 
following: 
The burden rests with [the prosecutor] to establish that 
[the impound] procedures were merely one of securing the 
automobile and protecting both the interests of the state 
and the defendant civilly [to justify the inventory search]. 
[T]he procedures followed by officer Bench certainly belie 
such a motivation on the part of the state and would 
indicate that in fact an investigatory search was underway, 
not simply an inventory for the civil aspects of the search. 
[T]he failure to follow what appeared to be the proper 
policies of the [police department] are a basis upon which 
the court finds that the manner of the search as well as the 
basis for the search was not proper. 
As to the issue of the search incident to an arrest, 
the court again finds that there seemed to have been no 
basis to do so. Perhaps most notable is that the record 
that was established with the testimony of the officers gave 
no indication that the search was undertaken for such a 
purpose. 
• * * 
[T]here were two searches [of the vehicle] and the one that 
was in question was [the one] by officer Bench. But the 
court believes that was clearly not performed with the 
intent to conduct the inventory search, but quite to the 
contrary, a search for contraband. . . . 
(R. 215-19.) The trial court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law granting Giron's motion to suppress the 
evidence. (R. 92-96.) The trial court's ruling focuses on 
Bench's search of the vehicle. (R. 233.) The state has appealed 
from those findings and conclusions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The state failed to present evidence in support of its 
7 
argument that the warrantless search of Giron's vehicle was 
justified under the incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
requirements of the state and federal constitutions. Because of 
the lack of evidence, the state failed to overcome the 
presumption that the search was unreasonable. 
In addition, the state argued the search of Giron's vehicle 
was justified under the "inventory" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment of the federal constitution and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. In connection with that argument, the 
state failed to demonstrate that Bench lawfully impounded Giron's 
vehicle before the search. Under the Utah Constitution, police 
are constitutionally required to seek an alternative disposition 
of an arrestee's vehicle before they may impound it. The 
alternative-disposition inquiry goes to the issue of "necessity" 
of impoundment. In this matter, Bench made no alternative-
disposition inquiry. 
Further, although Bench claimed he engaged in an "inventory" 
search of the vehicle, he failed to follow standardized 
procedures. The facts and inferences surrounding the search 
support the trial court's determination that Bench used it as a 
ruse for rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. 
Because the state failed to demonstrate that the search was 
justified under the inventory exception, the trial court 
correctly granted Giron's motion to suppress the evidence. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT BENCH'S SEARCH WAS 
INCIDENT TO ARREST, 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The general rule under the Fourth Amendment requires 
officers to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before 
searching an area where an individual has a "reasonable 
'expectation of privacy.'" State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 
985 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). "Warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967)); State v. 
Wells, Case No. 950773 (Utah App. November 21, 1996) . 
Only narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement 
exist. Strickling, 844 P.2d at 985. Where officers conduct a 
warrantless search, the state has the burden of establishing that 
the circumstances of the search "constitute an exception to the 
warrant requirement." Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762 (1969); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 
1984)). 
Establishing an exception is a highly fact intensive 
9 
proposition. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1252-53 (Utah 
App. 1990). Thus, the state's analysis concerning error must 
begin with the facts and circumstances properly marshaled in 
favor of the trial court's findings. See State v. Teuscher, 883 
P.2d 922, 930 (Utah App. 1994). 
In this matter, the trial court found the following with 
regard to Bench's search of the vehicle: 
4. After placing Mr. Giron under arrest and placing 
Mr. Giron in his (Bench's) vehicle, Officer Bench requested 
and obtained registration information relevant to Mr. 
Giron's vehicle which indicated that the vehicle was 
lawfully registered and licensed. 
5. Subsequent to obtaining the registration 
information, Officer Bench initiated a search of Defendant's 
car which revealed controlled substances. 
• * * 
7. That at the time he conducted a search of Mr. 
Giron's vehicle, Officer Bench expressly justified the 
search as an inventory, which he stated was necessary as a 
result of a need to impound Mr. Giron's vehicle. 
8. That Officer Bench never asked the Defendant if 
his passenger could accept custody of the vehicle, if there 
was someone in his home that could accept custody of the 
vehicle, and never inquired of Mr. Giron's passenger if he'd 
be willing to take custody of the vehicle. 
9. The reported inventory search conducted when 
Officer Bench in this case was carried out in a manner 
contrary to established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for 
an inventory search in the following particulars: 
(a) Inventory forms were not used. 
(b) No written list of items found was made. 
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record 
what was found where. 
(d) There was not attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his 
passenger, or others at Mr. Giron's residence in the 
decisions to impound. 
10. Although Officer Bench articulated that his 
purpose in searching Mr. Giron's car was to inventory the 
items in the vehicle, his actions in searching the vehicle, 
his testimony, and his demeanor upon the witness stand 
indicated that the search was conducted for an investigatory 
police purpose. 
11. At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. Giron's 
car, any possibility of Mr. Giron gaining access to the car 
for purposes of recovering a weapon, or concealing or 
10 
destroying evidence had been completely eliminated by the 
arrest, handcuffing, and the removal of [Mr. Giron] from the 
area of the vehicle. 
• * * 
1. That as a result the Defendant's vehicle being 
parked directly across from his residence, impoundment was 
neither authorized nor necessary. 
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, 
the "inventory" search was merely a pretext for an 
investigatory search for evidence. 
3. That at the time of the search [Mr. Giron] had 
been secured and removed from the area, that there was no 
physical or temporal proximity to the arrest, and no basis 
to justify the search of [Mr. Giron's] vehicle as a search 
incident to arrest. 
(R. 93-95 (emphasis added).) 
Those findings and conclusions are consistent with the 
facts, which reflect that Bench conducted a search of the vehicle 
some unspecified time after he arrested Giron. (R. 131-133; 155.) 
The search was conducted for investigatory reasons where Bench 
failed to comply with impounding and inventory procedures. (R. 
156-160.) Bench "completed" the investigatory search, then 
contacted Russell, who arrived at the scene and performed an 
inventory search from top to bottom "as if nothing had been done" 
-- as if "Bench had never been in that vehicle." (R. 174.) Based 
on Bench's testimony and his demeanor on the witness stand, the 
trial court was not persuaded by Bench's characterization of the 
search as an "inventory" search or the state's claim that the 
search was incident to arrest. "The procedures followed by 
Officer Bench certainly belie such a motivation on the part of 
the state and would indicate that in fact an investigatory search 
was underway." (R. 216.) 
Notwithstanding the facts, the state seeks reversal of the 
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trial court's ruling on the basis that Bench conducted the 
warrantless search pursuant to the "incident-to-arrest" 
exception. That exception failed to justify Bench's conduct as 
set forth below. 
A. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
"INCIDENT TO ARREST" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that contemporaneous with arrest, it 
is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the area into 
which the arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items, i.e. the area within the arrestee's "immediate 
control." Id. at 763. A warrantless search "incident to arrest" 
is justified if the state can show that certain temporal and 
geographical factors and exigent circumstances existed at the 
time of the arrest. Id. at 764; see also, Shipley v. California, 
395 U.S. 818, 819-20 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 
(1970); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n. 2 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring) (limiting warrantless search to "an 
area within which a suspect could reasonably be expected to grab 
a weapon or destroy evidence"); State v. Ricks, 816 P.2d 125, 128 
(Alaska 1991) (a search remote in time or place from arrest 
cannot be justified). 
In connection with the state's claim in its brief that 
Bench's search was "incident to arrest," the state ignores the 
exigency factor and disregards the lack of evidence concerning 
"immediate control" and temporal proximity. Although the state 
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is well aware that it is required to marshal all evidence and 
inferences in support of the trial court's ruling, it has failed 
to do so. Among other things, the state makes no mention of the 
time lapse between the arrest and the search, or of the fact that 
Bench obtained registration information for the car and engaged 
in a computer check sometime after the arrest but before the 
search.1 Those facts dispel the notion that the search was a 
contemporaneous incident of the arrest. 
Likewise, the state presented no evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing to support the spatial proximity requirement. The trial 
court correctly found that the state failed to prove the 
physical or temporal proximity requirements. (R. 95.) 
In addition, according to Bench, the officers were dealing 
with a static situation. The threat that Giron would injure the 
officers or destroy evidence did not exist, since Giron was 
handcuffed, in police custody, and in the police car at the time 
of the search. The trial court properly determined that where the 
evidence failed to rebut the presumption, the warrantless search 
could not be justified. See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253. 
1
 In its Motion for Summary Reversal, the state improperly assumed 
the temporal requirement was met "because [the search] was completed 
before the tow truck arrived to take the vehicle to the police impound 
lot, and before Giron himself had been transported to jail." (State's 
Motion for Summary Reversal, dated 4/10/96, at 2.) That statement 
reflected only that the search was made, not that it was a 
contemvoraneous incident of the arrest. In its Brief, the state has 
refrained from engaging in such unfounded speculation. Its silence 
suggests it has conceded the lack of evidence concerning temporal 
proximity. 
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The trial court's ruling is consistent with the law set 
forth in cases cited by the state. The courts have required the 
governmental entity to demonstrate the search was a 
contemporaneous incident of the arrest and limited to the area 
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items, i.e. the area within the arrestee's "immediate 
control." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). In 
addition, the courts have imposed an exigency element: the search 
is justified where a threat to the officers' safety exists. 
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), a single officer 
engaged in a high speed chase, overtook the vehicle and four 
passengers, pulled the vehicle over, ordered its occupants out of 
the car, observed evidence of marijuana in plain view, arrested 
the four occupants, and searched them and the vehicle contem-
poraneous to the arrest. Id. at 455-56. The search yielded 
cocaine, which Belton moved to suppress as evidence. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court determined the search was valid as 
contemporaneous to the arrests and recognized safety concerns: 
[T]he "search was conducted by a lone peace officer who was 
in the process of arresting four unknown individuals whom he 
had stopped in a speeding car owned by none of them and 
apparently containing an uncertain quantity of a controlled 
substance. The suspects were standing by the side of the 
car as the officer gave it a quick check to confirm his 
suspicions before attempting to transport them to police 
headquarters..." 
Id. at 457. The Belton Court further established the 
considerations incident to arrest by adopting a bright-line test: 
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[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
that automobile. 
Id. at 466 (emphasis added). 
After Belton, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kent, 665 
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983), also emphasized the safety of the officers 
as a consideration: Officers surrounded a trailer that housed 
parolees and a suspect of several armed robberies. During the 
surveillance, defendant drove up, entered the trailer, went back 
to his car, and into the trailer again. Thereafter, officers 
ordered the trailer occupants to surrender, defendant came out, 
sounded his automobile horn, and began to drive away. Other 
occupants bolted from the trailer and took off running in 
different directions. 
[Defendant] was stopped, handcuffed and required to lie on 
the ground adjacent to his automobile . . . [H]e remained 
within reach of the automobile. Also other suspects were 
loose in the area and firearms were being discharged. 
Id. at 1318. Contemporaneous to the arrest, the police officer 
observed shotgun shells in the defendant's automobile in plain 
view and asked the defendant if he had a gun. "Receiving no 
reply, [the officer] looked under the seat and observed the 
barrel of a sawed-off shotgun." Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
justified the search contemporaneous to the arrest where there 
was "an obvious threat to safety." Id.2 
2
 The state also has cited to State v. Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769 (Utah 
App. 1991) . As this Court has recognized, that case is distinguishable. 
[T] he defendant was arrested on a public sidewalk in the company of 
(continued...) 
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Likewise, in In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), the 
officer observed drug paraphernalia and open containers in plain 
view in the defendant's pickup truck, the officer arrested the 
defendant and an occupant, and contemporaneous thereto, with the 
arrestees standing unrestrained "near the side of the pickup," 
the officer searched the truck. Id. at 1045-46; see also State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (search incident to arrest 
exception based on probable cause and exigent circumstances). 
The state suggests that in light of the cases cited above, 
and State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1996), the facts and circumstances of this matter 
justify the warrantless search of Giron's automobile. (S.B. at 
14.) Moreno concerns the temporal aspect of the search: The 
warrantless search must be a contemporaneous incident of the 
arrest to be valid. Id. at 1247. The lack of evidence in this 
case to support temporal proximity and exigent circumstances 
compels affirming the trial court's ruling. No evidence exists 
in this case bearing on the search as a contemporaneous incident 
of the arrest. Without such evidence, the state cannot establish 
that the trial court's finding, "that there was no physical or 
2(...continued) 
his wife and babies. Id. at 773. The Harrison court relied on the 
search incident to arrest line of cases involving searches of 
automobiles and noted the public nature of the arrest meant "there 
was no way to secure [the diaper bag] at the scene pending the 
obtaining of a warrant to search it. The bag, stroller, and babies 
were going to be moved. Additionally, babies being babies, somebody 
would need to get into the bag before long." 
State v. Wells, Case No. 950773 (Utah App. November 21, 1996) . The 
events surrounding the search in Harrison are not comparable. 
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temporal proximity to the arrest" (R. 95), is clearly erroneous. 
In addition, the state cannot overcome the presumption that the 
warrantless search was unreasonable. 
B. THE STATE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS GIRON FROM THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED BY POLICE IN THIS MATTER. 
The trial court also invalidated the warrantless search 
under the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 14 is identical 
in part to the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but 
is given more force. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-68 
(Utah 1990); accord. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1991); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1991).3 
3
 The majority of the Utah Supreme Court has supported at various 
times analyzing art. I, sec. 14 in a manner separate from the fourth 
amendment in order to provide the citizens of Utah with greater, 
predictable protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See 
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
461, 473 (Utah 1990) , joined by Chief Justice Zimmerman; Chief Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229, 1239 
(Utah 1996) ("I must point out that the lead opinion's directive to Utah 
courts to construe article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in a 
manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment except in 
compelling circumstances is not supported by a majority of this court and 
is not Utah law . . . [I] fault the lead opinion for blindly adhering 
to federal precedent on this [search and seizure] issue"); and Justice 
Howe's lead opinion in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1991) 
(interpreting article I, section 14 to provide greater protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures than federal counterpart). 
Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurred in the result in Larocco, but 
has not yet committed to accepting the constitutional theories set forth 
in that case. See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) . 
Notwithstanding, Associate Chief Justice Stewart embraces the court's 
responsibility to independently interpret Utah constitutional provisions : 
If this Court were to view its constitutional duty to construe the 
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights in the exact same 
manner as the United States Supreme Court construes analogous 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, we would violate the spirit and 
intended effect of Utah constitutional law and policy as established 
by the framers of the Utah Constitution. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (Stewart, J., concurring). But see id. at 
(continued...) 
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The drafters of the Utah Constitution intended to afford the 
Utah provision more force and to provide the citizens of this 
State with greater protections from governmental intrusions. 
According to Mormon history, Utah pioneers suffered persecution 
at the hands of murderous mobs in Ohio and Illinois, fled the 
extermination order of Missouri's Governor Boggs,4 and suffered 
more persecution in the Utah Territory from federal marshals 
engaged in warrantless raids of their property in search of 
polygamy-law offenders. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search ad 
Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L. 267, 276 (1991) ; Panek, Search and 
Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolvcramv Raids, 62 Utah 
Historical Quarterly 316 (1994) (hereinafter "Panek"). The 
newspaper recounted the warrantless raids as "outrages," "carried 
out without even a warrant giving the perpetrators the authority 
[to search]." Panek at 327 (quoting, Deseret News, March 10, 
1886). The original Utah pioneers strongly supported state's 
rights. Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 7 (1988) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Firmage"). 
3(...continued) 
1235 (Justice Russon: "Although we are obligated to provide a state law 
review, such an independent analysis is not necessarily a different 
analysis"). 
4
 Governor Lilburn Boggs of Missouri issued the infamous 
"extermination order" to General Samuel D. Lucas of the State Militia, 
as follows: "The ringleaders of this rebellion should be made an example 
of; and if it should become necessary for the public peace, the 'Mormons' 
should be exterminated, or expelled from the state." Firmage and 
Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 74, 82 (1988). Shortly after Boggs issued 
the extermination order, a mob led by the state militia massacred a 
number of Mormons, including children, at Hauns Mill and arrested leaders 
of the Mormon church. Jd. at 74. 
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In support of state's rights, the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted a separate and distinct post-Belton automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement of art. I, sec. 14 and has eliminated 
"some of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement that 
have been developed by federal law in recent years." Larocco, 
794 P.2d at 469. 
Specifically, [Utah courts] will continue to use the concept 
of expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion 
for determining whether article I, section 14 is applicable. 
Then if article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches 
will be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or 
the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence. See 
id.; see also, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752[.] 
As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh: 
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the officers 
with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, 
there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot take 
the time to secure a warrant. Such a requirement would 
present little impediment to police investigations, 
especially in light of the ease with which warrants can be 
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 
1953, § 77-23-4 (2) . 
Id. at 469-70 (emphasis added). In applying art. I, sec. 14, the 
Utah courts have consistently held that the warrantless search of 
a vehicle may be justified only when probable cause and exigent 
circumstances exist. See Sims v. State Tax Com'n, 841 P.2d 6, 8-
9 (Utah 1992); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1192-94 (Utah App. 
1991). The probable cause/exigent circumstances inquiry provides 
Utah citizens with more protections from automobile searches than 
the federal "incident-to-arrest" exception, which fails to 
consider whether the officer had articulable probable cause to 
conduct the search. 
In the event Belton fails to provide arrestees with the 
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protections from warrantless searches identified in Larocco, this 
Court must affirm the trial court's ruling on the basis that the 
search was unreasonable under art. I, sec. 14. Other states have 
refused to adopt the rule of Belton under relevant state 
constitutional provisions in connection with automobile searches 
incident to arrests. See State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 
(Ohio 1992), cert, denied, 121 L.Ed.2d 127 (1992) (declining 
under state constitution to adopt rule of Belton); State v. 
Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959-60 (N.J. 1994) (under state 
constitution Belton shall not apply). 
The evidence before this Court refutes, among other things, 
the existence of an exigency and probable cause at the time of 
the search. (See Point I.A., supra.) Thus, there is no 
persuasive reason why, under art. I, sec. 14, the officer could 
not have taken the time to secure a warrant. That result is 
implicit in the trial court's findings and conclusions, where it 
ruled the search was violative of "Defendant's right to be free 
from illegal searches and seizures as guaranteed by our . . . 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution." (R. 95.) 
Consistent with the trial court's ruling that the search 
violated the Utah Constitution (R. 95) and the proposition that 
"this Court may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper 
ground," Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247 n.l, the analysis under art. I, 
section 14 is sufficient basis for affirming the trial court's 
decision that the search was impermissible. 
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POINT II. THE SEARCH WAS INVALID AS AN "INVENTORY SEARCH" 
WHERE THE INVOLVED OFFICER UNLAWFULLY IMPOUNDED THE CAR 
AND/OR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES FOR 
INVENTORYING THE CONTENTS OF THE CAR. 
A routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle 
is also a recognized exception to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. See South Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
In Qpperman, the United States Supreme Court recognized inventory 
searches serve three purposes: (1) "the protection of the 
owner's property while it remains in police custody," (2) the 
protection of "the police against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property," and (3) "the protection of the police from 
potential danger." Qpperman, 428 U.S. at 370; see also State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452# 454 (Utah 1987) (citing Qpperman, 428 U.S. 
at 369-70). Based on these purposes and the lesser expectation of 
privacy in vehicles, the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles 
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even though such 
searches are not based on probable cause, so long as officers 
follow standardized procedures for inventorying the contents of a 
lawfully impounded vehicle and there is no suggestion that the 
inventory "was a pretext concealing an investigatory police 
motive." Qpperman, 428 U.S. at 376. 
The Utah courts likewise have discussed the parameters of 
inventory searches in Strickling, 844 P.2d at 985; State v. Rice, 
717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986); State v. Stercrer, 808 P.2d 122, 
124-26 (Utah App. 1991); Hvcrh, 711 P.2d at 268-70; and State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454-55 (Utah 1987) . Those cases along 
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with Opperman, and additional authority from the United States 
Supreme Court, support the following: (1) the state has the 
burden of establishing "the necessity for the taking and the 
inventory of the vehicle" (Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 268); (2) the 
vehicle must be lawfully impounded for the inventory search to be 
reasonable (Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 268; Rice, 717 P. 2d at 696; 
Stercrer, 808 P.2d at 125 ("the impoundment and inventory search 
of defendant's car" must be justified)); (3) the inventory search 
must be conducted according to standardized procedures which are 
designed to produce an inventory of the items in the vehicle and 
not as a "fishing expedition for evidence" (Sterger, 808 P.2d at 
125); (4) the State has the burden of introducing evidence that 
such a standardized, reasonable procedure exists and that the 
challenged police activity was essentially in conformance "with 
that procedure" (Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988 (quoting Hygh, 711 
P.2d at 269 (quoting 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.4, at 576-
77 (1978)))); and (5) an inventory search cannot be conducted as 
a pretext for investigating criminal activity and searching for 
evidence of a crime (Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 268; Rice, 717 P. 2d at 
696) . 
The trial court in this matter ruled the search was invalid 
under the "inventory" exception where impoundment was not 
authorized or necessary, Bench failed to conduct the search in 
accordance with standardized procedures, and the search yielding 
contraband was conducted as a pretext for investigating criminal 
activity and searching for evidence of a crime. (R. 95.) The 
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trial court's ruling is correct. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE IMPOUNDMENT WAS 
NOT AUTHORIZED OR NECESSARY. 
In considering the validity of an inventory search, the 
Court "must first determine whether there was reasonable and 
proper justification for the impoundment of the vehicle. . . . If 
the impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary, the search 
was unreasonable." Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 268 (cites omitted). The 
state bears the burden of proving reasonableness, justification, 
authorization, and necessity for the impoundment. Id. 
The state has acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hycrh ruled that as part of the necessity inquiry, "police are 
constitutionally required to seek alternative disposition of an 
arrestee's vehicle before they may impound it; in other words, [J 
police must show 'necessity7 of impoundment." (S.B. 18); Hycrh, 
711 P.2d at 268-70. Thus, the officer is required to give the 
defendant the opportunity to arrange for disposition of his own 
car, i.e. for a release of the car to "a party designated by the 
owner rather than be impounded." Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 268. The 
alternative-disposition inquiry is mandated under Hygh and is a 
consistent alternative to impoundment, where the arrestee is 
given the opportunity to make arrangements to protect his own 
property, thereby releasing the police of any responsibility for 
the car. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 (for purposes of 
impoundment exception). 
The state disregards the Utah precedent as "dictum" and 
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asserts the law established in Hygh "has been repudiated" by the 
United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 
375 (1987). (S.B. at 17-18.) According to the state, in Bertine 
the Court ruled officers have discretion to impound an arrestee's 
vehicle "so long as discretion is exercised according to standard 
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of 
criminal activity," and that such discretion has no relation to 
the "proximity of an arrestee's automobile to his or her 
residence" or the "need" to impound. Id. (S.B. 16.) The state's 
reliance on Bertine is too limiting as set forth below. 
1. The State Has Failed to Take into Consideration the Fact 
that the Court in Hygh Relied in Part on the Utah 
Constitution to Invalidate the Search; Thus, Hycrh Cannot Be 
Repudiated by Federal Case Law. 
In mandating the "alternative-disposition" inquiry, the Hygh 
court relied in part on the state constitutional provision 
proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
at 2 64 (citing to U.S. Const, amend. IV; and Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 1 4 ) . A federal court cannot repudiate a state's interpretation 
of a state constitutional provision. Hygh supports the 
determination that under the Utah Constitution, an officer must 
make the "alternative-disposition" inquiry for the necessity 
showing to justify impoundment. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268-70 
(relying on expanded protections under Utah Const, art. I, § 14) . 
That determination does not reach the Fourth Amendment issue 
addressed in Bertine. 
Indeed, this Court has acknowledged that Hygh controls when 
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assessing a search under art. I, § 14. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 
1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1993). In addition, in a plurality opinion 
the Utah Supreme Court looked to Hygh in "applying an automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 
(Utah 1990) . Hygh continues to be sound precedent for 
interpreting art. I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. To the Extent Bertine Is in Conflict with Hvcrh, Hygh 
Should Be Reaffirmed Under the Utah Constitution. 
Where a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision 
conflicts with existing Utah case law, it is appropriate to 
consider whether the prior Utah decision should be reaffirmed 
under state constitutional provisions. See In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 650 (Utah 1988) (reaffirming the 
holding in State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969, 975 (Utah 1967), under 
the Utah constitution). In In re Criminal Investigation, 754 
P.2d at 633, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a witness 
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury pursuant to the Utah 
Subpoena Powers Act was entitled to protections in the form of 
warnings against compelled self-incrimination. The court 
determined the Act "raise [d] sufficient self-incrimination 
concerns" that some form of warning would be required. Id. at 
648. Thus, the court fashioned a five-part warning using Miranda 
as a guide. The "fifth" part of the warning would apply "only to 
'targets' of the [grand jury] investigation. Such persons must 
be notified prior to questioning or the compelled production of 
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evidence of their target status and of the nature of the charges 
under consideration against them." Id. at 649. 
The Utah court recognized that in considering a similar 
issue, the United States Supreme Court refused to adopt a warning 
under the fifth amendment applicable to "target" witnesses. Id. 
at 649-50 (considering U.S. v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977)). 
11
 [T] he entire tone of Washington constrains us from finding that 
the federal constitution requires routine target warnings in the 
context of all Subpoena Powers Act interrogations." Id. at 650. 
The Utah court next considered "whether, as a matter of state 
law, we will require target warnings" under article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 650. 
Fully ten years before Washington, this Court ruled in State 
v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 225, 429 P.2d 969, 975 (1967), 
that article I, section 12 requires that state grand jury 
witnesses be notified of their target status and of the 
charges being considered against them. At this time, we see 
no reason to reexamine our holding in Ruggeri, and we think 
that Subpoena Powers Act targets are similarly situated with 
respect to their privilege against self-incrimination as are 
state grand jury targets. Therefore, we hold that the 
target warnings required by Ruggeri must be given to 
Subpoena Powers Act targets, and we read such a requirement 
into the Act. Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
Id. The Ruggeri court only nominally mentioned article I, § 1 2 . 
Yet its reference was sufficient for the Utah Supreme Court to 
reaffirm the Ruggeri holding under the Utah Constitution. In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 650. 
Hence, In re Criminal Investigation demonstrates that when a 
Utah court is asked to determine whether a Utah decision was 
overruled by subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, it 
is appropriate and necessary to consider whether the decision 
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should be reaffirmed under the Utah Constitution. The state 
suggests in Point II of its brief that Bertine has overruled 
Hycrh. In Hygh, 711 P. 2d at 268, the Utah Supreme Court relied on 
the state constitutional provision, art. I, § 14, to require the 
"alternative-disposition" inquiry. Thus, Hygh is the established 
law under article I, section 14 governing impoundments in this 
jurisdiction and should be reaffirmed on that basis. 
In applying Hygh to the facts of this case, the state is 
forced to concede the following: 
The trial court's holding was based upon its finding that 
"[t]here was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, 
or others at Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of 
impound" (R. 96, finding 9(d)). That finding is correct. 
(S.B. at 16 (emphasis added).) Bench did not recall assessing 
whether Giron's second passenger could drive Giron's car from 
directly across the street where it was parked on the curbside 
into the driveway. (R. 156.) Bench did not check to see whether 
there was some alternative to impounding the vehicle. (R. 156.) 
He did not ask Giron whether "there were any neighbors or some 
other person who could drive [the] car into his driveway across 
the street from where he was parked." (R. 157.) The lack of 
evidence defies Bench's claim that he had "nobody to turn the 
vehicle over to." (S.B. 17.) The state failed to demonstrate 
necessity. As in Hygh: 
[T]he vehicle was parked next to the curb in a lawful 
parking area; no valuables were visible, and defendant had 
not indicated any were extant; a passenger was available to 
remove any valuables for safekeeping at defendant's request 
and to arrange for a third party to remove the vehicle; the 
car would have been locked and left unattended; and no 
evidence was presented to indicate that there was a danger 
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to police or public. In this case, the State has not met 
its burden of showing the necessity for the seizure of the 
vehicle. 
Hycrh, 711 P.2d at 269 (emphasis added). The facts support the 
determination that the impoundment was unlawful. The state had 
the burden of establishing that a lawful impoundment occurred. 
In this case, the state failed to carry its burden. 
B. BENCH ENGAGED IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH FOR DRUGS BEFORE 
AN INVENTORY WAS COMMENCED. 
Even if the impoundment was justified, the trial court 
correctly ruled the search was unconstitutional. Inventory 
searches of lawfully impounded vehicles are reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment so long as they are conducted pursuant to 
standardized police procedures and are not a pretext to search 
the vehicle for investigatory purposes. The United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized the role of standardized procedures 
in determining the reasonableness of inventory searches. See, 
e.g., Bertine, 479 U.S. at 370; Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 
(1990). "[A 's]ingle familiar standard is essential to guide 
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on 
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront.'" Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375 
(quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (quoting 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458)). In addition, 
an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general 
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The 
policy or practice governing inventory searches should be 
designed to produce an inventory. The individual police 
officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory 
searches are turned into "a purposeful and general means of 
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discovering evidence of a crime," Bertine, 479 U.S., at 376, 
107 S. Ct., at 743 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
Wells, 495 U.S. at 3. 
In this matter, the search yielding the controlled substance 
was not conducted in conformance with inventory procedures. It 
was conducted for investigatory purposes. The state attempts to 
stretch Bench's investigatory search into the latter inventory 
search conducted by Russell in order to justify Bench's conduct. 
This Court should decline to make such a stretch, as set forth 
below. 
1. Bench Failed to Act in Compliance with Standardized 
Inventory Procedures for Conducting an Inventory Search. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Stricklincr, 844 P. 2d at 979 
that "the pivotal determination with respect to the inventory 
search issue" is whether the state presented sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that the searching officer "acted in 
compliance with established procedures for conducting an 
inventory search." Id. at 988. "Inventories should not be upheld 
under Opperman unless the government shows that there exists an 
established reasonable procedure for safeguarding impounded 
vehicles and their contents and that the challenged police 
activity was essentially in conformance with that procedure." Id. 
(citing Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 269 (quoting 2 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 7.4, at 576-77 (1978))). 
The state has the burden of establishing the existence of 
standardized procedures which are designed to produce an 
inventory of the items, and that officers followed such 
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procedures. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d at 988-89. 
In Hygh, the court invalidated the inventory search as 
unconstitutional where the officers failed to follow the 
"regularized set of procedures [for Salt Lake City officers] 
which guard against arbitrariness by an officer in the field." 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 269-70. The officer "did not completely search 
the vehicle and did not make any kind of a list of the items in 
the automobile." Id. at 270. Additionally, it appeared that the 
officer was searching the vehicle for investigatory purposes 
since the officer, who noticed that Hygh resembled a picture of a 
robbery suspect, sent for and received that picture prior to 
conducting the search. Accordingly, the "'inventory' search was 
merely a pretext for a warrantless search," and the Utah Supreme 
Court suppressed the evidence. Id. 
In the present case, the state has focused in its argument 
on the search conducted by Russell: 
As demonstrated by State's exhibit 2 (copied in appendix II 
of this brief), Officer Russell did complete a standard 
impoundment and inventory form, documenting the items that 
he found in Giron's automobile. Officer Russell did 
complete that documentation contemporaneously to the actual 
search: he explained, at the evidentiary hearing on the 
motion to suppress, that he was required to complete the 
inventory form before turning the automobile over to the 
towing company (R. 172) . 
(S.B. at 22-23.) Yet "the reported inventory search that is 
being referenced here [is the search conducted] by Officer 
Bench." (R. 233.) 
Apparently, the state seeks to bootstrap Bench's search off 
of Russell's subsequent search. It asserts: "nothing . . . 
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prohibits inventory duties from being divided between two 
officers, as happened in this case." (S.B. at 23.) The trial 
court's findings and conclusions (R. 94) and the facts of record 
in this case do not support the determination that the inventory 
search was "divided between two officers." They support the 
contrary: Bench testified that he did not document his 
procedures; after he "completed" his search of the vehicle, he 
dispatched Russell to the scene (R. 159-160); Russell testified 
that Bench made no indication whatsoever that he had initiated an 
inventory search of the car. (R. 173-174.) Thus, Russell per-
formed a full inventory search from top to bottom "as if nothing 
had been done" -- as if "Bench had never been in that vehicle." 
(R. 174.)5 In this matter, the state failed to carry its burden 
of establishing that Bench complied with standardized procedures. 
5
 The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts set 
forth in State v. Sterger, 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) , where the court 
did not reject a "bifurcated"-inventory-search theory. In Sterger, the 
defendant drove off the road in a remote area and collided with an 
embankment, killing one passenger and injuring two others. As a result 
of the accident, the vehicle was inoperable. Thus, when the county 
deputy arrived he was involved in arranging ground and air transportation 
from the area to medical facilities for the injured parties and a tow 
truck for the car. In the course of moving the vehicle, the deputy 
initiated an inventory search and found what appeared to be marijuana in 
a container. The deputy was forced to postpone completion of the 
inventory search because he had to prioritize his time and attend to the 
injured parties and the defendant. Id. at 126. The deputy completed the 
inventory search two days later, after the vehicle was towed to a state 
certified impound yard. Id. at 124. He found marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia, listed the items on an inventory sheet, then seized them 
in evidence. Id. In this matter, at the time Bench engaged in his 
search, two officers were on the scene while Giron was in handcuffs in 
the officers' vehicle. If the impoundment had been lawful, conceivably 
Bench could have performed an inventory search, filling out the paperwork 
and completing the search without interruption, if he chose to perform 
such a search. However, Bench chose to search the car for investigatory 
purposes. He called a third officer to the scene for the purpose of 
performing the actual inventory search. 
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Thus, the trial court recognized the search to be a subterfuge 
for a criminal investigation. The true inventory search took 
place only after Bench completed the investigatory search and 
confiscated the items. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
ordered suppression of the evidence seized from the car. 
2. The "Pretext" Inquiry Is Necessary in the Inventory 
Search Context. 
The totality of the circumstances set forth above 
demonstrates that the inventory search was a pretext or 
subterfuge to search the vehicle for evidence. When the United 
States Supreme Court carved out the inventory search as an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment requirements, it clarified that 
such a search did not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as 
there was no suggestion that the inventory search "was a pretext 
concealing an investigatory police motive." Opperman, 428 U.S. 
at 3 76. The search could not be "a ruse for a general rummaging 
in order to find incriminating evidence." Wells, 495 U.S. at 3; 
see also Hycrh, 711 P. 2d at 268 ("the inventory exception does not 
apply when the inventory is merely xa pretext concealing an 
investigatory police motive7"); Rice, 717 P.2d at 696. 
The state urges this Court to abandon the "pretext" inquiry 
in assessing inventory searches on the basis that such an inquiry 
is contradictory to "Fourth Amendment law." (S.B. at 21.) 
[T] he possibility of a "pretext inventory analysis" is 
distinctly out of step with all of the Supreme Court's other 
Fourth Amendment law, canvassed in [Whren v. U.S., 116 S.Ct. 
1769 (1996)], holding that objective actions, rather than 
"ulterior motives," are at issue in determining whether 
police action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. For 
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the same reasons set forth in Whren and in the Utah Supreme 
Court's rstate v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)] 
decision, there is no sound reason (under the federal or 
state constitution) to invalidate an automobile inventory 
search merely because the officer conducting the search 
harbored an "ulterior motive" to uncover evidence of a 
crime. 
(S.B. at 21.) In support of its argument, the state relies on 
Lopez and State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995), which are 
cases concerning police investigations of criminal conduct. 
Investigatory searches and activities are distinct and separate 
from inventory searches, as further set forth below. 
a. "Criminal-investigation" searches. Investigatory 
activity implicates the warrant requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267-68. It is well-established 
that in the "criminal-investigation" context, the state must 
demonstrate probable cause or reasonable suspicion as an 
exception to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 741. In the "criminal-investigation" 
context, the "pretext" doctrine is unnecessary where probable 
cause and/or reasonable suspicion limit the scope of the 
officer7 s conduct. 
An officer who observes a traffic violation has probable 
cause to stop the driver. Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.2. 
Likewise, specific articulable facts may give an officer 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a driver is committing 
a traffic offense. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 
(Utah 1987). In either case, stopping the driver is 
constitutionally justified. This is so despite the 
officer's motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to 
the traffic offense. The "reasonable scope" requirement 
precludes the officer from investigating such motivations or 
suspicions because the detention can "last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135. 
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The rationale for disregarding the "pretext doctrine" in 
Lopez was essentially the following: When an officer has detained 
an individual based on a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 
he has complied with the Fourth Amendment requirement of 
reasonableness regardless of other ulterior motives. Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1135-37; see also Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1769. The pretext 
doctrine is unnecessary since the officer has a valid basis to 
detain the individual and is required under the Fourth Amendment 
to limit the scope of the detention to that which "is necessary 
to effectuate the purposes of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 
(quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). 
In State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995), the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated the following: 
[I]f police have a valid right to arrest an individual for 
one crime, it does not matter if their subjective intent is 
in reality to collect information concerning another crime. 
. . In other words, if the alleged pretext arrest could have 
taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's 
involvement in another crime, than the arrest is lawful . . 
. . The arrest was not rendered invalid solely because the 
officers had a separate motive for arresting him. . . . 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1205 (quoting State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1238 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 476 (1993)). The 
validity of Fourth Amendment activity for "criminal-
investigation" purposes is analyzed on an "objective criteria, 
not on an officer's subjective motivations or suspicions." Id. 
at 1206. In support of the criminal-investigation purpose, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1196, and Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1127, that the pretext doctrine will not serve to 
invalidate the Fourth Amendment activity where reasonable 
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suspicion or probable cause constitutionally justifies the 
officer's activity. See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1204 (citing Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1134). 
b. "Inventory" searches. The state's reliance on Harmon 
and Lopez is misplaced in considering "inventory" searches. 
Rather than focusing on what the hypothetical reasonable officer 
would do, inventory cases focus on whether the "inventory" search 
was merely a pretext to search for evidence. 
Because inventories promote [important caretaking interests 
of protecting an arrestee's property and ensuring the police 
against claims of lost or stolen property] and are not 
investigatory in purpose, they do not implicate "the 
interests which are protected when searches are conditioned 
on warrants."[] Therefore, inventory searches are not per se 
unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment and 
article I, section 14. Contraband or other evidence of crime 
discovered in a true inventory search may be seized without 
a warrant and introduced into evidence at trial. [] However, 
the inventory exception does not apply when the inventory is 
merely "a pretext concealing an investigatory police 
motive."[] Fundamental constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling them 
"inventory" searches. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267-68. 
In Whren v. U.S., 116 S.Ct. at 1773, the petitioner urged 
the Court to invalidate a "criminal investigation" search on 
pretext grounds -- petitioner claimed the officer had ulterior 
motives. In support of that proposition, the petitioner cited to 
"inventory" search cases, including Wells, 4 95 U.S. at 1, and 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367. The Court rejected the petitioner's 
argument and recognized the distinction between the pretext 
inquiry in the "inventory" search context where the purpose is 
caretaking, versus the pretext doctrine in the "criminal-
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investigation" context where the search or detention is based on 
probable cause. See Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1773. After reiterating 
the pretext inquiry in the "inventory" search context, the Court 
stated the following: 
[0]nly an undiscerning reader would regard [the inventory 
search cases, i.e. Wells, Bertine and New York v. Burger, 
482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636 
(1987) (an administrative inspection case)] as endorsing the 
principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police 
conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause 
to believe a violation of law has occurred. In each case we 
were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the 
absence of probable cause. Our quoted statement simply 
explains that the exemption from the need for probable cause 
(and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the 
purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not 
accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes. 
See Bertine, supra, at 371-372, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 107 S. Ct. 
738; Burger, supra, at 702-703, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 
2636. 
Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1773 (emphasis added). 
A similar criticism applies in this matter. Only an 
undiscerning reader would regard the "criminal-investigation" 
search cases, i.e_._ Harmon, Lopez, Whren. as endorsing abandonment 
of the pretext inquiry that is necessary to the "inventory" 
search analysis. Courts have consistently ruled that a valid 
inventory search does not occur where "the inventory xis merely a 
pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.'" Hygh, 711 
P.2d at 268 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376); see also State 
v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1987); Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. 
Indeed, the inventory exception is based on the determination 
that such searches are reasonable because they protect important 
interests, are conducted pursuant to standardized procedures, and 
are not used as a subterfuge to search for evidence. Therefore, 
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an important justification for allowing an inventory search 
exception is that inventories are not conducted as a pretext or 
subterfuge. The pretext inquiry in the inventory analysis 
remains valid. 
In this case, the circumstances demonstrate that Bench's 
search was investigatory. Because the state failed to establish 
that the evidence found in the vehicle was located during a valid 
inventory search, the evidence must be suppressed. See Wells, 
495 U.S. at 4; Rice, 717 P.2d at 697. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and as set forth in the 
record on appeal, Giron respectfully requests the entry of an 
order affirming the trial court's ruling suppressing the 
evidence. 
SUBMITTED this *?-£& day of J^Ut^^^JUu^ , 1996. 
LINDA M. JONES A 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Rules, Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
Art I, § 14 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
History: Const. 1896. Liquor, search, seizure and forfeiture, 
Cross-References. — Controlled Sub- § 32A-13-103. 
stances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
ADDENDUM B 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Third Judicial District 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, Esq., No. 3768 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-2114 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ANGELO R. GIRON, 
Defendant. 
I AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
> and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 951900702FS 
> Judge Bohling 
The above-entitled manner came on for hearing on the 30th day of October, 1995, 
The State was present and represented by its counsel, Richard Ramp and Fred 
Burmester. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel James C 
Bradshaw. The Court having received the States Memorandum and Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and having received 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, and having heard the 
testimony presented at the hearing of September 18, 1995, and further having heard the 
arguments of counsel on October 30, 1995, and being otherwise advised in the matter 
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issues of the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on January 22, 1995, Salt Lake City Police Officer, D. Bench, stopped the 
vehicle of Defendant Angelo Giron, based on Mr. Gironfs commission of traffic 
violations and other criminal offenses committed in the officers presence. 
2. Mr. Giron's vehicle at ftie time of his detention and arrest was lawfully parked 
directly across from Irs residence. 
3. After stopping the vehicle, Officer Bench immediately placed Mr. Giron under 
arrest, handcuffed Mr. Gircn, and placed Mr. Giron into Officer Bench's vehicle. 
4. After placing Mr. Giron under arrest and placing Mr. Giron in his vehicle, 
Officer Bench requested and obtained registration information relevant to Mr. Gironfs 
vehicle which indicated that the vehicle was lawfully registered and licensed. 
5. Subsequent to obtaining the registration information, Officer Bench initiated a 
search of Defendant's car which revealed controlled substances. 
6. No controlled substances were in plain view of the officer. 
7. That at the time he conducted a search of Mr. Giron's vehicle, Officer Bench 
expressly justified the search as an inventory, which he .stated was necessary as a result of 
a need to impound Mr. Giron's vehicle. 
8. That Officer Bench never asked the Defendant if his passenger could accept 
custody of the vehicle, if there was someone in his home that could accept custody of the 
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vehicle, and never inquired of Mr, Giron's passenger if he'd be willing to take custody of 
the vehicle. 
9. The reported inventory search conducted when Officer Bench in this case was 
carried out in a manner contrary to established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for an 
inventory search in the following particulars: 
(a) Inventory forms were not used. 
(b) No written list of items found was made. 
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record what was found 
where. 
(d) There was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others at 
Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of impound. 
10. Although Officer Bench articulated that his purpose in searching Mr. Giron's 
car was to inventory the items in the vehicle, his actions in searching the vehicle, his 
testimony, and his demeanor upon the witness stand indicate that the search was 
conducted for an investigatory police purpose. 
11. At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. Giron's car, any possibility of Mr. 
Giron gaining access to the car for purposes of recovering a weapon, or concealing or 
destroying evidence had been completely eliminated by the arrest, handcuffing, and the 
removal of the Defendant from the area of the vehicle. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That as a result the Defendant's vehicle being parked directly across from his 
residence, impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary. 
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, the "inventory" search was 
merely a pretext for an investigatory search for evidence. 
3. That at the time of the search the Defendant had been secured and removed 
from the area, that there was no physical or temporal proximity to the arrest, and no 
basis to justify the search of Defendant's vehicle as a search incident to his arrest. 
4. The search of Defendant's vehicle cannot be justified under any exceptions to 
the warrant requirements of the Utah State and United States Constitution. Therefore, 
evidence discovered in the Defendant's vehicle must be suppressed as violative of 
Defendant's right to be free from illegal searches and seizures as guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment by the United States Constitution, and by our Article 1, Section 14 
of the Utah State Constitution. 
DATED this day of January, 1996. 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLI I^G 
Third District Court Jtrdge J 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j(j^ day of January, 1996,1 mailed the 
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Richard G. Hamp 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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